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ANNUAL SURVEY OF TENNESSEE LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-1957 TENNESSEE SURVEY
JAMES B. EARLE*
Only a few cases by the Tennessee Supreme Court decided during
the survey year considered questions of general administrative law.
These concerned the timing and extent of judicial review of admin-
istrative action and the conduct of hearings by agencies.
Prerequisites to Judicial Review: Whether available administrative
remedies must be exhausted by a litigant before seeking a review or
other relief by court action is a question not always capable of exact
prediction.' The "long settled rule of judicial administration that no
one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury
until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted"2 is
subject to a number of exceptions.3 In State v. Yoakum4 a number of
teachers brought a suit under the Declaratory Judgment Act for a de-
cision with respect to their rights under the transfer provisions of
the Teacher Tenure Act of 1951.5 The teachers alleged that a majority
of the county board of education had transferred them to different
schools without the concurrence of the county superintendent and that
the action of transferring them was "arbitrary, capricious and con-
tumacious." The contention was raised that the teachers had failed to
exhaust their administrative remedy of an appeal to the county board
of education as analogous to the right of appeal from a suspension or
dismissal by the superintendent. The court held that, under the allega-
tions of the complaint that the action of the board was arbitrary, an
appeal to the board which had already decided the issue would be use-
less and the appeal was not required prior to court action. In an earlier
case, State ex rel. Jones v. Nashville,6 the court had declined to reverse
* Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Alabama Bar.
1. See Davis. Administrative Remedies Often Need Not Be Exhausted, 19'
F.R.D. 437 (1957).
2. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1933).
3. See Study: Exhaustion of Adm;nistrative Remedies, 2 Race Rel. L. Rep.
561-82 (1957) for a consideration of the application of the doctrine of ex-
haustion of administrative remedies to school segregation-integration prob-
lems under the "pupil placement acts" recently enacted by several Southern
states.
4. 297 S.W.2d 635 (Tenn. 1956).
5. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 49-1401 to -1420 (1956). The particular section in-
volved in this action, § 49-1411, was amended by Tenn. Pub. Acts 1957, c. 202,
TEND. CODE ANN. § 49-1411 (Supp. 1957) so as to remove any doubt as to the
concurrent authority of county superintendents of education (who are elected
by the board) and boards of education in transferring tenure teachers.
6. 198 Tenn. 280, 279 S.W.2d 267 (1955). See Earle, Administrative Law-
1956 Tennessee Survey, 9 VA=. L. REv. 913, 914 (1956).
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on appeal the dismissal of a writ of mandamus brought by a former
city employee to require his reinstatement in the city's employ where
it was shown that an administrative appeal previously available to the
employee had not been exhausted even though the time for obtaining
the appeal had expired. In that case, however, the administrative
remedy had been rendered futile by the neglect of the petitioner, and
not, as here, by the action of the administrative agency itself.
Exhaustion of state administrative remedies was referred to by the
federal district court in Thomas v. Chamberlain.7 In that case a suit
for damages arising out of the condemnation of property in Chatta-
nooga was brought under the Federal Civil Rights Acts. In granting a
motion for summary judgment by the defendants the court found that
"simple and adequate" administrative remedies available to the plain-
tiff had not been exhausted, as would be required before it could be
found that the plaintiff had been deprived of a federal right.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction was involved in the case of
AZaddin Industries v. Associated Transport8 decided by the Court of
Appeals, Middle Section. This was a contempt action involving the
violation by union drivers for common motor carriers of an injunction
requiring the carriers to furnish service to a "struck" plant. It was
contended by the contemnors that the case involved a labor dispute
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board
or an administrative dispute under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Interstate Commerce Commission or of the Tennessee Public Service
Commission. The basis of the action was held, however, to be the
vindication of the common law or statutory right of a shipper to
service by a common carrier; a matter for initial decision by the courts
and not within the primary jurisdiction of any of the above agencies.
The differing methods of review provided for by the statutes for the
"ordinary" revocation or suspension of a motor vehicle operator's
license9 (by petition for certiorari to the circuit court of the county of
residence) and for the "mandatory" revocation of the vehicle registra-
tion certificate and operator's license under the Financial Responsi-
bility Law 0 (by trial de novo in the chancery court of Davidson
County) were involved in Roney v. Luttrel." There one whose opera-
tor's license and vehicle registration had both been revoked by the
Commissioner of Safety proceeded for review under the provisions
pertaining to "ordinary" revocation of an operator's license and the
petition was dismissed. On appeal the Supreme Court held that the
7. 143 F. Supp. 671 (E.D. Tenn. 1955).
8. 298 S.W.2d 770 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1956). See also, Sanders, Labor Law and
Workmen's Compensation-1957 Tennessee Survey, 10 VAND. L. REV. 1110, 1112
(1957).
9. TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-713 (f) (1956).
10. TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-1202 (1956).
11. 292 S.W.2d 411 (Tenn. 1956).
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two statutes are not complementary so as to permit a review of both
revocations by either method and that the latter method provided
under the Financial Responsibility Law is the exclusive method in
such a situation.
Hearings: What constitutes a "fair hearing" by a county beer board
was considered in Chanaberry v. Gordy. 12 The hearing in question
involved the revocation of a beer license. It appeared that there had
been at least an informal stipulation between counsel that the revoca-
tion would not be considered at certain meetings of the board when it
was, in fact, so considered. Under such a state of facts (with the
added fact that the license holder was not present at the board meeting
when the revocation was voted) the court held that the action by the
board was arbitrary and properly subject to reversal by the circuit
court on certiorari. It also is to be inferred, although the court's
opinion does not elucidate the point, that at least one member of the
board voted on the revocation without having been present at the
hearing of the evidence. As to this, the court stated that each member
of the board which acts must have heard the evidence. This poses
somewhat of a corollary to the famous statement by Chief Justice
Hughes in the case usually referred to as the "First Morgan Case"'
3
that "the one who decides must hear."'14 In the Morgan case, however,
"hear" seems to have been used in the sense of a final consideration of
the evidence as distinguished from the actual audition of the testimony.
In any event, it is futile to speculate on possible implications of the
court's statement in the absence of a more concrete factual situation.
Judicial review: The question, discussed at some length in a previous
survey issue,15 of an attack on the legality of the constitution of a beer
board in review of an action by the board, e.g., revocation of a license,
was again raised in Jones v. Sullivan County Beer Board.16 In the
present case, however, the attack was made only as to the incompetence
of one member of the beer board rather than the entire board as was
discussed in the mentioned article. The court found the questioned
member to be at least a de facto member and thus to be beyond the
collateral attack of third parties, at least in the type of proceeding then
before the court.
Legislation: Chapter 32 of the Public Acts of Tennessee, 1957,17
repeals and substantially reenacts the Dental Practice Act of 1935.18 A
number of changes were inserted to meet constitutional objections to
12. 292 S.W.2d 18 (Tenn. 1956).
13. Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936).
14. See DAVIs, ADVwNISTRATIVE LAw 331-33 (1951).
15. Sanders, Administrative Law-1955 Tennessee Survey, 8 VAND. L. REV.
940, 943 (1955).
16. 292 S.W.2d 185 (Tenn. 1956).
17. TENN. CODE AN. §§ 63-530 to -558 (Supp. 1957).
18. Previously TENN. CODEs Am. §§ 63-501 to -529 (1956).
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the prior act raised by a chancery court. 9 Among the other changes,
the new act specifies the powers and duties of State Board of Dental
Examiners.
Chapters 374 and 375 of the Public Acts of Tennessee, 1957, the State
Aeronautics Commission Act 20 and the Municipal Airport Act,21 re-
spectively, provide for rather general regulatory control over air
navigation and airports within the state. There does not, however, ap-
pear to be any significant departure from other regulatory acts creating
administrative agencies to control various activities.
19. The Tennessee Supreme Court has later held, however, that the sup-
posed constitutional objections do not exist. State Board of Dental Examiners
v. Rymer, 303 S.W.2d 959 (Tenn. 1957).
20. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 42-201 to -224 (Supp. 1957).
21. TtNN. CODE ANN. §§ 42-301 to -310 (Supp. 1957).
